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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS  
ON EARNINGS QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
By 
 
Glenny L. Alawag, Jr. 
 
This paper tried to validate an emerging group of literature that found that in times of a 
recession or an economic crisis, the earnings quality of firms improves. Guided by the 
modified Jones model, the earnings quality of firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand was estimated for the pre-crisis (2005 to 2007), 
crisis (2008 to 2009) and post-crisis (2010 to 2016) periods. It turned out that the firms 
in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand exhibited an increase in earnings 
quality from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, and from the crisis to the post-crisis 
period, but only the improvement over the three periods in Malaysia and Singapore 
were found significant. The increase in earnings quality in Thailand was evident only 
after the crisis, whereas none of the changes in the Philippines were significant. On the 
other hand, Indonesian firms showed an opposite trend with a reduction in earnings 
quality during the crisis, but followed by an improvement in the post-crisis period.  
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The first decade of the twenty-first century was controversial for the scandals 
that permeated the whole world. The biggest was the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 
which is believed to have caused a swollen world financial system in the year 2008. 
The overwhelming impact on the economic performance is manifested in Figure 1. The 
simultaneous drop in the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates of the economic 
regions of the world proves that the extent and scope of the crisis was ostensibly 
magnified, although it is also clear that the depth or intensity of its impact on every 
region was contrasting. For instance, it is apparent that the South Asia region was not 
that badly affected, given the recovery which came earlier around 2009.  The growth in 
other regions, on the other hand, started to plummet in 2008, but had reached the bottom 
only in 2009, and started to recoup the following year. There is no doubt that North 
America and Europe were the worst affected with growth of less than negative two 
percent, because they were the main players in the mortgage securities game that 
eventually resulted in a stalemate. 
For many, it is natural to assume that a crisis induces a firm to manage or 
manipulate its earnings. However, in the last decade, recent studies have posited that 
the effect of a crisis may in fact be contrary to the conventional thought. It started from 
an idea that the business cycle affects the incentives for earnings management. It was 
first thought that an unattractive economy also renders the business unattractive, and so 
the manager uses its financial reporting discretion to devise a more attractive set of 
publicly available financial statements. The other side of the debate, which has drawn 
a growing number of empirical studies that are in part supporting the recent claim, 
argued that an unfavorable economy gives the manager an incentive to undo earnings 
management. Some of these incentives are due to more stringent regulations imposed, 
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or the hostile scrutiny from the highly-discerning and unhappy external stakeholders 
(Filip & Raffournier, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 1. Graph of annual GDP growth rates of selected economic regions from 2001 
to 2016. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
 The striking results of some studies that focused on the macroeconomic 
situation of a country and the corresponding response of managers have mostly 
concluded out of samples from the worst-hit regions during the crisis. Although most 
have confirmed that earnings quality improved after the crisis, it does not imply that 
the rest of the world followed the response.  
To test the impact on another region, like Asia, was reasonable. It was only ten 
years before the global crisis when another financial crisis hit Asia. It would be 
suspected that the weaknesses in the financial sector in the late 1990’s had been 
reevaluated and had received countermeasures that would have prevented another crisis 
 3 
with the same magnitude. The Southeast Asia region was even more fitting because of 
the conception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which, like 
the European Union, is an economic community and has since committed to financial 
integration. This would mean that although laws and accounting standards have been 
relatively different from one another, the countries have somehow patterned their 
regulatory standards from the one designed by the organization. Finally, as illustrated 
in Figure 2, like the world average, all the five countries’ GDP growth rates plummeted 
in 2008, then surged in 2010. A study of Johansson (2011) argued that the recent crisis 
affected East Asia through real economy channels and not particularly the financial 
sector. It was found by the study that there were high levels of co-movement in terms 
of volatility in the region during the GFC, compared with the pre-crisis period. 
 
Figure 2. Graph of annual GDP growth rates of the world, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore from 2001 to 2016. Source: World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
 
 The focus of most papers had been on the impact before and after the crisis. For 
some, during and after the crisis were not distinguished (Cimini, 2015; Costa, 
Cerqueira, & Brandao, 2016), whereas one only compared before and during the crisis 
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(Filip & Raffournier, 2014). However, because it is recognized that the response of 
regulators and standard-setters have time lags, it is inferred that the period after the 
crisis is distinct from the years 2008 and 2009. New laws are normally implemented 
months to years after an intensive investigation and legislative hearings; therefore, these 
regulations influence the incentives of the managers only when the implementation 
takes place. Moreover, because the vigilance of investors and lenders surge while 
uncertainty during a crisis advances, it is more appropriate to say that this behavior 
influences the incentives to earnings management during the event, that is when 
skepticism and risks are relatively high. These reasons led this paper to assume and 
compare three periods: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. 
Guided by an accrual quality metric commonly utilized in other research papers, 
this paper aimed to understand the impact of the GFC on the quality of earnings of a 
firm. Specifically, it sought to identify if significant differences existed on the measures 
before and during the crisis, during and after the crisis, and before and after the crisis, 
in each of the five Southeast Asian countries selected. Following the results of the 
recent studies on Europe, it was hypothesized that there was a significant improvement 
in the earnings quality in the firms in at least one of the five countries from the pre-
crisis to the crisis period, from the crisis to the post-crisis period, or from the pre-crisis 
to the post-crisis period. 
 The results of this study are expected to supplement policy makers’ resources 
that would help them understand the behavior of managers in a country in times of a 
recession and expansion. It should help them make better judgment and policies that 
should protect the interest of stakeholders aside from the managers.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second section reviews the 
related literature, highlighting the groups in the debate and the conflicting results; the 
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third section describes the model adapted, and the determination of the sample; the 
fourth section presents the data and discusses the findings; and the last section provides 
the concluding remarks. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The literature in earnings quality has seen a huge development in the past two 
decades. Many of which have made a milestone by changing the discussions and 
perspectives of academics and policymaking with regard to the behavior of firms in 
managing earnings. In this section, studies that explained the incentives to manage 
earnings were first reviewed, followed by papers that have discussed the potential role 
of economic condition in such incentives, which may lead to either a low earnings 
quality or a high earnings quality. 
 
A. Incentives to Earnings Quality 
 A group of studies have indicated that that earnings quality is low because there 
are motivations of the managers of a firm to engage in earnings management. One of 
these is the premise that a manager does not want to report a net loss or a decline in 
earnings relative to the preceding years, because these results send a negative message 
to other stakeholders. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) explained that insiders use 
their financial reporting discretion to prevent outsider interference. At times when 
earnings are unexpectedly high but the future appears bleak, they may use this 
discretion to shift earnings to the future, so as to avoid fluctuations or variability (Leuz 
et al., 2003). 
One common incentive that plays a role to this earnings-increasing earnings 
management is the earnings-based compensation arrangements. In fact, Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys (2004) associated the opportunistic behavior of managers before the 
implementation of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act to engage in earnings management on 
the compensation related to options. Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) 
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discovered that when the earnings are close to the upper-bound of the range that grants 
bonuses or higher compensation, the managers have a significant incentive to push the 
earnings upward. This is in consonance with the results of the study of Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) that showed that once confronted with small losses, the managers are 
more likely to use their accounting discretion. Shifting earnings also exists when the 
bonus ceiling has been reached, and so higher earnings would be less rewarding to the 
manager (Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Degeorge et al., 1999). 
Aside from sustaining positive and constant growth profits, managers are also 
likely to alter discretionary accruals to meet analyst expectations (Ayers, Jiang & 
Yeung, 2006; Degeorge et al.,1999), and to comply with debt covenant restrictions 
(DeFond, 1994). Earnings quality is likewise affected by agency problems, and a weak 
legal and institutional environment (Cohen et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003). This conflict 
of interest between the executives and outsiders occur because the executives know that 
their time horizon is limited, so they are very inclined to use accounting discretion in a 
self-serving manner (Degeorge et al., 1999). 
Other literatures posed that the aggressive behavior of managers to increase 
earnings relates to security issuances (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Kim & Park, 2005; 
Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998). The study of Teoh et al., (1998) showed that the use of 
accounting discretion is stronger and more persistent for seasoned equity offerings. This 
was confirmed by Kim and Park (2005) who posited that the behavior aimed at 
aggressively pushing the initial offering price. Earnings management increases the 
informative attribute of financial information, which should drive prices higher, but 
which also leads to a poorer earnings quality (Cohen et al., 2004; Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986). 
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B. Economic Condition and Low Earnings Quality 
Some empirical studies have also advanced how earnings quality is affected by 
factors other than those specific to a firm’s situation. One of the factors that has been 
the subject of recent literature is the macroeconomic condition of the country of 
operation of the firm. Scholars have been researching around the conjecture that in a 
poor macroeconomic condition, firms draw poor financial results, and so they respond 
with a management of earnings, and thus generate a low quality of earnings. As 
suggested by Filip and Raffournier (2014), the literature can be classified into earnings-
increasing and earnings-decreasing earnings management. As will be explained next, 
the choice of the direction of earnings management is driven by the various incentives 
of the managers. 
The first group of studies found that in times of an economic shock, the 
managers use their discretion to conceal the impact of the downturn on the cash flow 
from operations (Leuz et al., 2003). A recession also encourages managers to drive 
value relevance—how well the earnings explain the stock price and return. A study of 
Iatridis and Dimitras (2013) on the effect of the 2008 financial crisis on earnings quality 
in five European countries found that companies in Ireland, Italy and Spain had more 
value relevant financial results during the crisis. Moreover, the companies in Portugal, 
Italy and Greece engaged in earnings management in order to accommodate higher 
level of debt (Iatridis & Dimitras, 2013). 
In times of economic stress, firms may engage in an earnings-decreasing 
behavior for a number of reasons, such as to allow renegotiations with stakeholders. 
For example, government safety nets are easier to be availed with poorer financial 
results; banks provide higher tolerance during a crisis and may allow restructuring of 
debt rather than receiving less or reporting a zero net realizable value of their 
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receivables; and labor unions are more understanding and willing to negotiate, because 
they are aware that the economy as a whole is not faring well (Filip & Raffournier, 
2014). Related to availing government safety nets, a study of Charitou, Lambertides, 
and Trigeorgis (2007) observed that with high financial distress, the managers of the 
firms had shifted the earnings downwards before filing bankruptcy, indicating a higher 
pressure for conservative reporting to obtain government relief. Furthermore, 
executives are reluctant to report high earnings because it may mean early recovery, 
and so the expected future performance will be ratcheted up faster and higher than is 
attainable (Degeorge et al., 1999).  
 
C. Economic Condition and High Earnings Quality 
The turn of the century blossomed a new conjecture that conflicts with the 
orthodox belief that an economic crisis generates poor earnings quality. In times of 
economic stress, there is an increase in monitoring of stakeholders, prompting a more 
conservative behavior and more extensive disclosure requirements (Chia, Lapsley, & 
Lee, 2007; Kousenidis, Ladas, & Negakis, 2013; Shen & Chih, 2007). The study of 
Chia et al. (2007) showed that during the Asian financial crisis, there was a statistically 
significant reduction in earnings management behavior of listed companies audited by 
the Big-Six auditing firms. Choi and Pae (2011) confirmed in their study that covered 
periods after the Asian financial crisis that Korean firms with higher ethical 
commitment, which is guided my regulatory mechanisms, have higher level of financial 
reporting quality.  Another study found that highly leveraged firms are highly likely to 
be scrutinized more, which means that earnings management is very unfeasible (Shen 
& Chich, 2007). Highly leveraged firms have very strong incentives to increase 
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financial reporting quality partly due to high disclosure requirements and to appeal to 
more investors (Kousenidis et al., 2013). 
The pressure for earnings conservatism rises as a result of an economic 
contraction (Jenkins, Kane, & Velury, 2009). The demand for a high quality of financial 
reporting and audit quality (Chia, et al., 2007), and conservatism, as a consequence, 
leads to a control of information asymmetry and agency problems, and an increase in 
shareholder value (Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2013). As was observed by Cohen et al., 
(2004), earnings management declined following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The risk of 
liability exposure has also increased after stringent regulations have been put to effect. 
When Huijgen and Lubberink (2005) compared U.K. firms cross-listed in the U.S. with 
those not cross-listed, cross-listing was found to have helped improve investor value 
through earnings conservatism driven by dual reporting regimes. Earnings 
conservatism has also increased in clients that were formerly audited by Arthur 
Andersen and had moved to one of the Big-Four firms, which may have been due to an 
increased auditor litigation risk after the accounting scandals (Krishnan, 2007). 
A number of studies have concluded that, generally, earnings quality is not 
monotonic with the state of the economy (Bertomeu & Magee, 2011; Cimini, 2015; 
Filip & Raffournier, 2014; Kousenidis et al., 2013; Charoenwong & Jiraporn, 2009). 
One of the earliest in the literature that showed this is the analysis by Charoenwong and 
Jiraporn (2009) of the pre- and post- Asian financial crisis, which indicated that the 
non-financial companies in Thailand had stopped earnings management after the crisis. 
This was not concurred by the same analysis on Singapore, which indicated that there 
was no change in earnings management behavior of the companies (Charoenwong & 
Jiraporn, 2009). Similarly, there were conflicting results on the effect of the crisis on 
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firms in Europe, depending on the country and the choice of auditing firm (Iatridis & 
Dimitras, 2013). 
The more recent, broad and robust literature have also corroborated the 
conclusion. The results of the analysis by Bertomeu and Magee (2011) showed that 
financial reporting quality is high during expansionary times, is low during moderate 
times, and goes back up during recessionary periods. During the European debt crisis, 
earnings quality was also higher, on average, in the study that covered Spain, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal (Kousenidis, et al., 2013). Filip and Raffournier (2014) tested 
the impact of the GFC on earnings management in non-financial listed firms in the 
European Union, and found that earnings management has, in fact, significantly 
decreased during the crisis years. The paper of Cimini (2015) confirmed the prior 
results of related studies, and suggested that there was a decrease in earnings 
management or an increase in earnings quality in the majority of European countries 
after the financial meltdown in 2008. Finally, a more recent study by Costa et al. (2016) 
also suggested, through its analysis of firms in twenty-five EU countries over the period 
2006-2014, that earnings management is lower in times of financial crisis, and that the 
firms that pay dividends are less likely to manage earnings. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A. Model 
Francis, Olsson, and Schipper (2008) classified earnings quality measures that 
have been widely used in accounting research into two attribute groups: accounting-
based and market-based.  Of the seven measures, accruals quality, persistence, 
predictability and smoothness belong to the accounting-based attributes group, which 
do not consider the market prices of the stocks in the estimation. This research focused 
only on the measure of accrual quality. 
One of the reasons of a poor quality of accruals is the manager’s intentional bias 
towards accrual, or earnings management. Accruals quality is based on the idea that 
accruals are characterized by non-discretionary or normal accruals and discretionary 
accruals or abnormal accruals. The abnormal accruals appear as a result not by 
accounting fundamentals, rather on the financial reporting decision or discretion of the 
management (Francis et al., 2008). This means that the component that cannot be 
explained by the estimation model embodies discretionary accruals. High levels of 
discretionary accruals convey earnings management or low earnings quality.  
The typical estimations of discretionary accruals used the Jones (1991) model. 
Many empirical studies have found flaws and have made new extensions to the original 
model. One of the most widely used is the modified Jones model by Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney (1995), further extended by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). This 
research also followed the same estimation model, which distinctly suggested the 
reduction of the change in revenues by the change in accounts receivables because of 
the assumption that credit sales are discretionary (Dechow et al., 1995). As in the 
original Jones model, variables were scaled by lagged assets to reduce the impact of 
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firm size and heteroscedasticity. Kothari et al. (2005) also included return on assets as 
a performance measure to control for the impact of firm performance on abnormal 
accruals. The equation is as follows: 
 
 𝑇𝐴#$%𝐴#$%&' = 𝛽' 1𝐴#$%&' + 𝛽, Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉123 − Δ𝑅𝐸𝐶#$%𝐴#$%&' + 𝛽6 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑁#$%𝐴#$%&' + 𝛽9𝑅𝑂𝐴#$%&' + 𝜀#$% 
 
 
Where:  
TAict are the total accruals, net income less cash flow from operations, of the 
firm i listed in the country c during fiscal year t; 
Aict-1 are the lagged total assets of the firm i listed in the country c during fiscal 
year t-1;  
REVict are the revenues of the firm i listed in the country c during fiscal year t; 
RECict are the receivables of the firm i listed in the country c during fiscal year 
t; 
PPENict are the net property, plant and equipment of the firm i listed in the 
country c during fiscal year t;  
ROAict are the return on assets of the firm i listed in the country c during fiscal 
year t. 
The unstandardized residual from the equation estimates the discretionary 
accruals (Kothari et al., 2005). The unstandardized residuals were saved after running 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A decrease in the standard deviation was 
interpreted to suggest an improvement in earnings quality. 
The assumption of normality was also tested. As shown in the Appendix, based 
on a significance level of 5 percent, the residuals in each year for each of the five 
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countries were not normally distributed, and so nonparametric tests had to be used. To 
test if significant difference existed before, during and after the GFC, the nonparametric 
Friedman test of differences among related samples was conducted. In addition, a post 
hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted to test whether there was 
a difference between the discretionary accruals estimated before and during, during and 
after, and before and after the crisis.  
 
B. Sample and Data Collection 
The Southeast Asia region referred to in this research was limited only to the 
five largest economies—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
In addition to the size, these five countries’ equity markets were the most mature and 
have had a long-established reporting system for publicly-listed companies. The other 
countries’ markets were relatively new or have had issues with regard to consistency 
and transparency.  
Previous researches have tried to aggregate countries into a region such as the 
European Union. This was possible because the region’s member nations had agreed to 
universally implement International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Because the 
generally accepted accounting standards in the Southeast Asia region differ from one 
country to another, it was supposed to be unreliable to have only one group of samples 
that would represent the region. In the mid-2000s, many countries have started to adapt 
IFRS, but none had completely transitioned to the standard in all the periods covered in 
this research, which on the contrary would have made the comparability of financial 
results more certain. The lack of uniformity in the financial reporting standards 
suggested that the financial statements should then be distinct to the countries, and so, 
it was more appropriate to make a country-by-country analysis.  
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Because of the constraints that records may not be available, accounting 
standards may have made drastic shifts over a decade span, or that the resulting total 
samples may be limited because of the exclusion of newly-listed firms, the year 2005 
was marked to be the earliest period covered in this research. The twelve years of 
financial results, from 2005 to 2016, were then divided into three parts. The years 2005 
to 2007 represented the pre-crisis period, whereas the years 2008 and 2009 represented 
the crisis period. The years that follow, 2010 to 2016, represented the post-crisis period. 
As detailed in Table 1, all firms that were not listed in all the years covered, 
including 2004 for the lagged data, were excluded from the total sample. Likewise, all 
financial firms, which were classified under GICS code 4010 for banks, 4020 for 
diversified financials, and 4030 for insurance companies; and those with incomplete or 
missing data that were defined in the research model were also excluded. The values, 
which were retrieved from the Bureau Van Dijk Osiris database, net totaled 204 for 
Indonesia, 524 for Malaysia, 103 for the Philippines, 310 for Singapore, and 327 for 
Thailand. The sample determination resulted with total observations of 17,616 firm-
years. 
 
Table 1 
Sample Determination 
  Total ID MY PH SG TH 
All listed firms  3,059   529   912   261   655   702  
Less: Not listed from 2004-2016  1,252   297   315   85   264   291  
Less: Firms with missing data  275   22   58   67   54   74  
Less: Financial firms  64   6   15   6   27   10  
Total firms included in the sample  1,468   204   524   103   310   327  
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Table 1 (Continued)       
Firm-years (pre-crisis, 2005-2007)  4,404   612   1,572   309   930   981  
Firm-years (crisis, 2008-2009)  2,936   408   1,048   206   620   654  
Firm-years (post-crisis, 2010-
2016) 10,276   1,428   3,668   721   2,170   2,289  
Total number of firm-years 17,616   2,448   6,288   1,236   3,720   3,924  
Note. Samples calculated through the filter function of Bureau Van Dijk Osiris 
database. Country Codes: ID = Indonesia, MY = Malaysia, PH = Philippines, SG = 
Singapore, TH = Thailand. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
 
 Table 2 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression using the 
modified Jones model for each of the five countries. It shows that only 31.7 percent of 
the variation in scaled total accruals was accounted for by the model in the case of the 
Philippines, whereas other countries fell below with only 13.1 percent accounted for by 
the model in the case of Thailand. However, it reveals that in all of the countries, the 
model statistically significantly predicted the scaled total accruals. Likewise, all the 
independent variables were not highly correlated with other independent variables, and 
were statistically significant predictors in the model. 
Table 2 
Results of Regression Using the Modified Jones Model 
Country Variable Coefficient t VIF R2 F 
Indonesia Model    .248 201.23*** 
 Scale_1 1245.122** 22.84 1.11   
 Scale_DeltaREVlessDeltaREC .042** 8.61 1.16   
 Scale_PPE -.091** -16.63 1.22   
  ROA .002** 6.78 1.07    
Malaysia Model    .202 398.609** 
 Scale_1 185.894** 6.77 1.12   
 Scale_DeltaREVlessDeltaREC .057** 16.14 1.22   
 Scale_PPE -.118** -34.21 1.38   
  ROA .004** 27.09 1.08    
Philippines Model    .317 143.005** 
 Scale_1 335.698** 8.74 1.13   
 Scale_DeltaREVlessDeltaREC .028** 7.28 1.14   
 Scale_PPE -.151** -17.89 1.26   
  ROA .005** 16.68 1.21    
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Table 2 (Continued)      
Singapore Model    .193 222.274** 
 Scale_1 1177.839** 8.08 1.13   
 Scale_DeltaREVlessDeltaREC .033** 23.53 2.39   
 Scale_PPE -.143** -10.92 2.63   
  ROA .006** 14.38 1.06    
Thailand Model    .131 147.259** 
 Scale_1 67.021** 2.86 1.09   
 Scale_DeltaREVlessDeltaREC .042** 8.08 1.08   
 Scale_PPE -.108** -20.11 1.22   
  ROA .003** 16.39 1.21    
Note. Scale_1 is 1 divided by the lagged assets; scale_DeltaREVlessDelttaREC is the 
change in revenue less change in accounts receivables, divided by lagged assets; 
scale_PPE is the net property, plant and equipment divided by lagged assets; and ROA 
is the return on assets. 
**p < .01 
 
 
 The discretionary accruals denoted by the unstandardized residuals of the 
modified Jones model were next inspected to see whether there was a notable change 
in the standard deviation among the periods. In Table 3, it was apparent that in the case 
of Indonesia, the value increased from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period, 
indicating that accrual quality declined during the crisis. This was, however, reversed 
to a lower value than the pre-crisis during the post-crisis period to a .0675 standard 
deviation. The other four countries exhibited a decline in the measure from the pre-
crisis period to the crisis period, and from the crisis period to the post-crisis period. 
Singapore illustrated the biggest decline from the pre- crisis period with a .3217 to the 
crisis period with a .0983 standard deviation. A year-by-year comparison of the 
residuals is presented in Appendix B, which manifested how the year 2008 appeared to 
be different compared to the years preceding it. It was also noted that the individual 
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years that followed, fluctuations—such as in 2014 for Malaysia and Indonesia—in the 
standard deviation was evident. This infers that a non-macroeconomic event may have 
influenced the incentive of managers to manage earnings, considering that the GDP 
growth rate did not have a large fluctuation during the period in the case of Malaysia 
and Indonesia. 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Discretionary Accruals 
Country N Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Indonesia 2005-2007 204 -.0234 .0986 -.3849 .3493 
2008-2009 204 -.0518 .1369 -.9154 .6811 
2010-2016 204 -.0172 .0675 -.3994 .1975 
Malaysia 2005-2007 524 .0005 .0726 -.3590 .3957 
2008-2009 524 -.0182 .0654 -.4362 .3491 
2010-2016 524 .0025 .0593 -.2577 .7665 
Philippines 2005-2007 103 .0003 .0903 -.3090 .2793 
2008-2009 103 -.0129 .0758 -.2216 .2730 
2010-2016 103 -.0094 .0663 -.1922 .2118 
Singapore 2005-2007 310 .0091 .3217 -.4292 4.2102 
2008-2009 310 -.0355 .0983 -.3296 .6960 
2010-2016 310 -.0085 .0760 -.3077 .6866 
Thailand 2005-2007 327 -.0101 .1203 -.5086 1.4504 
2008-2009 327 -.0163 .1109 -1.0149 .8762 
2010-2016 327 -.0028 .0710 -.3256 .5421 
Note.  Discretionary accruals are the resulting unstandardized residuals derived from 
the modified Jones model. The residuals were averaged for each of the three periods 
compared: years 2005-2007 represent the pre-crisis years, years 2008-2009 represent 
the crisis years, and the years 2010-2016 represent the post-crisis years. 
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Based on the interpretation, a decline in the measure implied that earnings 
quality was higher over the following periods. However, to determine whether these 
changes are statistically significant, the nonparametric Friedman test of differences 
among repeated measures was conducted. In the results summarized in Table 4, with 
the exception of the Philippines, the test rendered a Chi-square value of 34.088 for 
Indonesia, 28.477 for Malaysia, 36.103 for Singapore, and 12.483 for Thailand, which 
were significant, based on a 5 percent level of significance. Although the Philippines 
was noted for a decrease in the measure, the Chi-square value of 1.01 rendered it not 
significant. 
A post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests was conducted to test the 
significance of the change between the periods. A Bonferroni correction was applied, 
resulting in a significance level set at p < .017.  As shown in Table 4, the increase in 
the measure from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period (Z = -5.09), and the decrease 
from the crisis period to post-crisis period (Z = -5.586) of Indonesia were significant. 
Similarly, in the case of Malaysia, the pre-crisis and crisis periods (Z = -5.565), and the 
crisis and post-crisis periods (Z = -6.236) were different. In the case of Singapore, the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods (Z = -3.67), and the crisis and post-crisis periods (Z = -
6.184) were also different. In the case of Thailand, only the difference between the pre-
crisis and crisis periods (Z = -.557) was not significant. It was noted, however, that 
Thailand was the only country with the difference in pre-crisis and post-crisis (Z = -
2.395) significant. The analysis affirmed the results of the Friedman test on the 
Philippines, which rendered that no statistical difference existed between and among 
the three periods. 
As noted earlier, the trend in the discretionary accrual measure of Indonesia 
contrasted with the prediction that the residuals should have decreased from the pre-
 21 
crisis to the crisis period. It is suspected that Indonesian managers’ discretion must have 
been less likely influenced by the GFC, because the country’s economy faired a lot 
better than its neighbors, as was illustrated in Figure 2. While the response to recession 
was found to increase financial reporting quality, moderate times create the opposite 
(Bertomeu & Magee, 2011). This must have what happened to Indonesian firms during 
the crisis period. 
 
Table 4 
Results of Nonparametric Tests of Difference Among the Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-
Crisis Periods 
Country Comparisons 
Friedman Test Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
χ 2 Asymp Sig. Z 
Asymp 
Sig. 
Indonesia Overall 34.088* 0.000   
 2005-2007 vs. 2008-2009   -5.09** .000 
 2008-2009 vs. 2010-2016   -5.586** .000 
  2005-2007 vs. 2010-2016     -1.568 .117 
Malaysia Overall 28.477* .000   
 2005-2007 vs. 2008-2009   -5.565** .000 
 2008-2009 vs. 2010-2016   -6.236** .000 
 2005-2007 vs. 2010-2016   -.545 .586 
Philippines Overall 1.01 .604     
 2005-2007 vs. 2008-2009   -1.359 .174 
 2008-2009 vs. 2010-2016   -.201 .841 
  2005-2007 vs. 2010-2016     -.645 .519 
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Table 4 (Continued)     
Singapore Overall 36.103* .000   
 2005-2007 vs. 2008-2009   -3.67** .000 
 2008-2009 vs. 2010-2016   -6.184** .000 
 2005-2007 vs. 2010-2016   -.841 .400 
Thailand Overall 12.483* .002     
 2005-2007 vs. 2008-2009   -.557 .578 
 2008-2009 vs. 2010-2016   -3.726** .000 
  2005-2007 vs. 2010-2016     -2.395** .017 
*p < .05 
**p < .017 (Bonferroni-adjusted significance level, .05 ÷ 3) 
 
The results of the analysis on the Philippine firms belong to another category. 
This is because the discretionary accruals measure decreased from the pre-crisis to the 
succeeding periods, and while it affirmed the prediction, the difference was not found 
to be significant. This result may be due to the inherent limitation of the samples 
associated with the Philippines.  Unlike other stock exchanges with at least 500 listed 
companies, the Philippines only had 261 listed in its bourse. Many of these firms are 
conglomerates that usually only manage their holdings in a well-diversified portfolio 
of subsidiaries, and their financial statements are a consolidation of the firms under the 
umbrella. The limitation lies on the offsetting effects of the consolidated financial 
reports, which may have made the results of the regression a little vague. Furthermore, 
while financial firms were excluded in the sample because of the sector’s specialized 
regulations, the included firms may otherwise have had holdings in financial firms, 
which means the exclusion was not complete. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Analysis showed that earnings quality, measured through the modified Jones 
model of accrual quality, showed contrasting results among the Southeast Asian 
countries. Four countries, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand showed a 
reduction in the measure from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, and from the crisis to 
the post-crisis period. Of which, two countries, Malaysia and Singapore, exhibited a 
significant decline in the measure from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, and from the 
crisis period to the post-crisis period. This implied that, for these two countries, 
earnings quality has significantly increased over the periods. On the other hand, the 
reduction of the measure in the Philippines was not found to be significant, while 
Thailand only showed a significant decrease in the measure from the crisis to the post-
crisis period. 
Indonesia was the only country which was observed to have resulted in an 
opposite trend with the prediction that earnings quality increases in times of a recession. 
A possible explanation could be that the economy was not severely affected, given the 
relatively low decline in GDP growth rate and the early recovery in 2009. A closer 
investigation as to the impact of the GFC to the economy may help understand the 
response of the Indonesian firms to the incentives created by a recession. 
The non-significant differences illustrated by the firms in the Philippines was 
suspected to have been caused by a large number of holding companies listed in the 
stock market. It would be more compelling to review the samples in this country and 
further exclude those affiliated with the financial firms. This remedy, however, would 
cause the already limited sample to decrease even more. More options need to be 
considered. 
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Aside from these results, it is recognized that the modified Jones model does 
not capture all the abnormal accruals of the firm. Although it is the most widely 
accepted metric, the limitations have also been emphasized by other researchers. 
Comparison with the results of other models that measure the other attributes of 
earnings quality may be a helpful guide in making a conclusion. It also does not 
necessarily mean that the abnormal accruals are caused by a bias to manage earnings, 
because an error in estimation could be another cause. Devising am earnings 
management score that integrates other variables would be essential in determining the 
level of discretion used by the managers that are associated with the bias to manipulate 
earnings. This was not done in this research because the primary objective was simply 
to test the quality of earnings. 
Finally, this research was aimed to validate prior literature in the earnings 
management debate. Hopefully, it will somehow become useful in the future in 
understanding the impact of the business cycle on management decisions and the 
financial statements, as well as in making policies attached to corporate governance. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1 
Results of Normality Test of Residuals 
Country Year 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Indonesia  2005 .121 204 .000 .892 204 .000 
2006 .088 204 .001 .900 204 .000 
2007 .102 204 .000 .893 204 .000 
2008 .199 204 .000 .624 204 .000 
2009 .113 204 .000 .896 204 .000 
2010 .100 204 .000 .931 204 .000 
2011 .133 204 .000 .875 204 .000 
2012 .168 204 .000 .682 204 .000 
2013 .197 204 .000 .613 204 .000 
2014 .127 204 .000 .860 204 .000 
2015 .125 204 .000 .841 204 .000 
2016 .286 204 .000 .279 204 .000 
Malaysia  2005 .110 524 .000 .849 524 .000 
2006 .123 524 .000 .824 524 .000 
2007 .111 524 .000 .859 524 .000 
2008 .083 524 .000 .911 524 .000 
2009 .075 524 .000 .922 524 .000 
2010 .075 524 .000 .956 524 .000 
2011 .097 524 .000 .885 524 .000 
2012 .125 524 .000 .830 524 .000 
2013 .145 524 .000 .670 524 .000 
2014 .273 524 .000 .209 524 .000 
2015 .147 524 .000 .664 524 .000 
2016 .154 524 .000 .612 524 .000 
Philippines  2005 .115 103 .002 .889 103 .000 
2006 .177 103 .000 .765 103 .000 
2007 .193 103 .000 .824 103 .000 
2008 .101 103 .012 .926 103 .000 
2009 .074 103 .200 .971 103 .023 
2010 .126 103 .000 .850 103 .000 
2011 .099 103 .015 .928 103 .000 
2012 .165 103 .000 .887 103 .000 
2013 .109 103 .004 .934 103 .000 
2014 .082 103 .086 .955 103 .001 
2015 .136 103 .000 .808 103 .000 
2016 .140 103 .000 .905 103 .000 
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Table 1 (Continued)         
Singapore  2005 .114 310 .000 .869 310 .000 
2006 .195 310 .000 .505 310 .000 
2007 .363 310 .000 .176 310 .000 
2008 .159 310 .000 .740 310 .000 
2009 .075 310 .000 .964 310 .000 
2010 .095 310 .000 .885 310 .000 
2011 .153 310 .000 .727 310 .000 
2012 .166 310 .000 .661 310 .000 
2013 .258 310 .000 .245 310 .000 
2014 .127 310 .000 .737 310 .000 
2015 .100 310 .000 .895 310 .000 
2016 .083 310 .000 .927 310 .000 
Thailand  2005 .131 327 .000 .873 327 .000 
2006 .239 327 .000 .374 327 .000 
2007 .075 327 .000 .954 327 .000 
2008 .166 327 .000 .672 327 .000 
2009 .166 327 .000 .642 327 .000 
2010 .107 327 .000 .907 327 .000 
2011 .114 327 .000 .882 327 .000 
2012 .131 327 .000 .827 327 .000 
2013 .120 327 .000 .787 327 .000 
2014 .144 327 .000 .782 327 .000 
2015 .173 327 .000 .657 327 .000 
2016 .119 327 .000 .802 327 .000 
Note. Table shows the results of the tests of normality of the residuals estimated through 
the regression using the modified Jones model, on a per year per country basis. Because 
the p-values are greater than 1% significance level, the normality assumption was not 
satisfied. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 2 
Annual Comparison of Descriptive Statistics of Discretionary Accruals 
Country   Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Indonesia 2005 -.0177 .1218 -.4106 .5595 
 2006 -.0280 .1426 -.9958 .4821 
 2007 -.0244 .1428 -.4010 .7393 
 2008 -.0412 .2100 -1.7685 1.3052 
 2009 -.0624 .1516 -.4897 .7717 
 2010 -.0275 .1326 -.4941 .5347 
 2011 -.0278 .1265 -.8498 .2928 
 2012 -.0197 .1361 -1.1022 .3746 
 2013 -.0092 .1711 -1.1078 1.5479 
 2014 -.0023 .0980 -.3842 .6474 
 2015 -.0258 .1120 -.7460 .3176 
 2016 -.0078 .2890 -.4305 3.8316 
 χ 2 61.3480    
 Asymp. Sig. .0000    
Malaysia 2005 .0063 .1013 -.2967 .8080 
 2006 .0001 .1062 -1.0376 .7110 
 2007 -.0049 .1217 -.7750 1.0254 
 2008 -.0125 .0886 -.7808 .3954 
 2009 -.0239 .0877 -.3745 .6815 
 2010 -.0096 .0896 -.4209 .3671 
 2011 -.0052 .0959 -.4317 .6148 
 2012 -.0036 .1075 -.4924 .9745 
 2013 .0049 .1085 -.2508 1.6368 
 2014 .0204 .2627 -.3358 5.6435 
 2015 .0029 .1003 -1.5014 .4013 
 2016 .0078 .1110 -.4929 1.7593 
 χ 2 83.8320    
 Asymp. Sig. .0000    
Philippines 2005 -.0105 .0961 -.4262 .3226 
 2006 -.0020 .1443 -.3405 .8723 
 2007 .0133 .1795 -.3778 .7660 
 2008 -.0082 .0957 -.2464 .4413 
 2009 -.0176 .0929 -.2615 .3438 
 2010 -.0164 .1151 -.2626 .5672 
 2011 .0026 .0940 -.1723 .3428 
 2012 .0017 .1231 -.3704 .4972 
 2013 -.0054 .0965 -.3192 .4192 
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Table 2 (Continued)      
 2014 -.0068 .0874 -.2877 .3274 
 2015 -.0289 .0950 -.6027 .1903 
 2016 -.0126 .0920 -.3031 .3203 
 χ 2 9.8340    
 Asymp. Sig. .5450    
Singapore 2005 -.0424 .1477 -1.0956 .4816 
 2006 -.0214 .2015 -.4990 2.7730 
 2007 .0910 .9164 -.6766 13.0347 
 2008 -.0210 .1527 -.3798 1.3415 
 2009 -.0501 .1112 -.4917 .4907 
 2010 -.0231 .1264 -.9709 .5303 
 2011 -.0030 .1364 -.3109 1.4782 
 2012 -.0080 .1437 -.4318 1.6877 
 2013 .0115 .2717 -.2756 4.4541 
 2014 -.0077 .1180 -.3813 1.2279 
 2015 -.0125 .0972 -.3083 .7079 
 2016 -.0164 .0975 -.4480 .5883 
 χ 2 75.7810    
  Asymp. Sig. .0000       
Thailand 2005 -.0034 .1220 -.5760 .5884 
 2006 -.0078 .2865 -.7316 4.1793 
 2007 -.0191 .1125 -.4589 .4540 
 2008 -.0117 .1558 -1.7728 .6141 
 2009 -.0210 .1507 -.4716 1.8901 
 2010 -.0024 .1280 -.4410 .8454 
 2011 .0003 .1213 -.3838 .8706 
 2012 -.0017 .1372 -.4107 1.0640 
 2013 .0051 .1178 -.3319 1.0051 
 2014 -.0011 .1291 -.4222 1.2516 
 2015 -.0082 .1473 -1.6239 .6933 
 2016 -.0117 .0982 -.3684 .9466 
 χ 2 34.0040    
  Asymp. Sig. .0000       
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